





 ◊√isha Abd al-Ra˛mān (Bint al-Shā†i√) (d.1998) and her approach to tafsır: 




1  Modern literary tafsır and Bint al-Shā†i√1 
Well-known by the pseudonym Bint al-Shā†i√,2 ◊√isha Abd al-Ra˛mān is one of the 
twentieth century Muslim intellectuals who left an indelible mark on modern literary 
exegesis of the Qur’an. She advocated and applied an approach developed by her 
teacher and husband Amın al-Khūlı (d. 1966), who had a path-breaking influence on her 
academic and intellectual journey. Her published studies of the Qur’an were all 
dedicated to al-Khūlı during his life as well as posthumously. Her introductions to these 
studies and their re-prints, without exception, acknowledge her indebtedness and 
conformity to his academic method and literary approach to tafsır, perhaps far beyond a 
student’s sense of duty and gratitude.  But then she was, as al-Khūlı himself described 
her, ‘a disciple of a literary school to which he belonged and the lady of a house in 
which he resided.’3 
 
This literary school, which emerged in Egypt and the Arab world in the twentieth 
century, has roots in a pre-modern sub-tradition of Muslim Qur’an hermeneutics that 
paid special attention to the rhetoric (bal gha) of the Qur’an and contributed to 
evolving a concept of the Qur’an’s linguistic inimitability.4 In this sub-tradition, the 
disciplines of language, rhetoric and Qur’an exegesis were all interconnected. With the 
advent of the modern university and its secular disciplinary paradigms, the Qur’an was 
excluded from the study of literature and relegated to the ‘class of traditional exegesis.’5  
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During his years as Professor of Arabic language and literature at King Fu√ d I 
University (now the University of Cairo), the thrust of al-Khūlı’s literary project was to 
reinstate the Qur’an as the greatest book of Arabic literature (kit b al- arabiyya al-
akbar) at the heart of modern Egyptian literary studies.
6
 The project was carried forward 
by Bint al-Shā†i√ and some of his other students like Muḥammad A˛mad Khalafallah 
(Al-Fann al-qaṣaṣı fi’l-Qur√ n al-karım, 1953) and Shukrı Ayyād (Yawm al-dın wa’l-
ḥisāb fi’l-Qur√ n, M.A. Thesis, n.d.),7 and continued in the following generation of 
Arabic studies, mainly by Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd.8  
The literary school of tafsır and Amın al-Khūlı  
The beginnings of modern literary tafsır have been traced back to Muḥammad Abduh’s 
(d.1905) publication of the first critical edition of Dal √il al-i j z and I j z al-Qur n, 
the two major works of the classical philologist and rhetorician Abd al-Q hir al-Jurj nı 
(d. 471/1078).
9
 Abduh criticized the post-classical fixation on poetic form and stylistic 
craft which dominated Arabic literary studies until the nineteenth century. His 
publication of al-Jurj nı’s works was intended to revive the classical emphasis on an 
idea of taste based on a sound sense of Arabic for an appreciation of the Qur’an’s 
eloquence (bayān). The aim of this aesthetic would be to understand the psychological 
and intellectual impact of this ethically infused eloquent language on its hearers – which 
transformed the Arabs from warring tribes to a great and dominant civilization. This, for 
Abduh, required the cultivation of a literary taste (dhawq) through the diligent study of 
al-Jurj nı, in addition to constant engagement with the finest works of Arabic literature, 









The foregrounding of the literary aspect of exegesis is Abduh’s main contribution to 
the literary school. The direct influence of his ideas can also be traced in both al-Khūlı 
and Bint al-Shā†i√. In al-Khūlı, it is expressly manifest in a sustained attention to 
psychological impact, which becomes elaborated into a concept of contextuality: the 
historical and cultural background of the text’s first hearers is examined to discover 
what it meant in their context, in order to assess its impact on them.
11
 In Bint al-Shā†i√, 
Abduh’s idea of cultivating a literary taste for the Arabic language appears to have 
marked her work and career.  It is evident not only in her defence of taste as a 
hermeneutic principle,
12
 but also in her choice to study in her doctoral thesis (1941-
1950) one of the most complex classical Arab poets, Abū al- Al √ al-Ma arrı (d. 
449/1058). The fact that her tafsır came out after two decades of writing literature, 
practising literary criticism and teaching the Arabic language, thereby realising the type 
of exegete Abduh had envisioned, is crucial to Bint al-Shā†i√’s perception of her own 
credentials as a literary exegete of the Qur’an.13 But the main intellectual stimulus to her 
work comes from al-Khūlı’s elaboration of Abduh’s rudimentary ideas on the relation 
between tafsır and literature into an exegetical approach to the Qur’an, for which he 
coined the term al- tafsır al-adabı.14 
 
Al-Khūlı’s approach to the Qur’an as ‘the greatest book of the Arabic language’ must 
not however be seen as circumscribed within a purely literary framework. Rather, it was 
part of a larger Islamic programme of renewal which attributed to the Qur’an 
transformative potential for culture and society. What gives the literary approach 
priority in this programme is the fact that the first Arabs accepted Islam ‘on the basis of 
evaluating the Qur’an as a literary text that surpasses all human production.’15 The 






soundly comprehended in the same way that it had been by its first Arab hearers.
16
 The 
literary study, therefore, ‘precedes any other juristic, social or poetic investigation of the 
Qur’an.’17 It should be premised, al-Khūlı maintained, on a distinction between the text 
(al-naṣṣ) and that which surrounds it (m  ˛awl al-naṣṣ), giving primacy to the study of 
this latter aspect. This entails, first and foremost, the study of i) the world in which the 
Qur’an was revealed, specifically the cultural, political and social history of ancient 
Arabs until the time of revelation; and ii) the historical formation of the Qur’an, mainly 





The knowledge rendered by studying the Qur’an’s historical context (m  ˛awl al-naṣṣ) 
would provide the grounds for the subsequent linguistic investigation of the text (al- 
naṣṣ). However, this enquiry too was perceived by al-Khūlı to be historical in the first 
place. Its principle aim is to establish the emergence and development of word 
meanings (t rıkh ÷uhür al-ma nı), by applying the methods of historical philology. Al-
Khūlı even attempted, with limited success, to produce a lexicon that dates Arabic and 
Qur’anic connotations, taking into consideration the different periods of revelation.19 
Echoing Abduh, he emphasised that the ensuing analysis of grammatical, stylistic and 
poetic structures should focus on the meanings and their effect, and not on grammatical 
or artistic craft. The study of any of these linguistic aspects must be conducted 
empirically by undertaking a topical analysis of all the relevant Qur’anic occurrences 











concerns, which led him to formulate a historical concept of revelation as descent 
(inz l). Applying his own method to the term inz l in the Qur’an, he concluded that it 
describes the bringing of God’s inner speech from one place to another ‘in a 
metaphorical sense intended to [indicate] its coming into existence amongst people and 
its formation in the world.’21 Influenced by Nöldeke’s Geschichte des Qorans, al-Khūlı 
thus attempted to historicise the Qur’an without negating its divine origin, a line of 
thinking that has reverberated since then in Abū Zayd’s notion of inz l as 
transformation of the Qur’an from divine revelation to a human text.22  
 
It is in light of these historicist considerations that al-Khūlı’s preoccupation with the 
Qur’an’s history can be understood. In addition to his historical lexicon, he embarked 
on a comprehensive critical history of the Qur’an entitled T rıkh al-Qur n, which 
aimed at explaining how the text’s historical unfolding shaped its form and content.23 
He viewed these historical studies, which remain incomplete and in manuscript form,
24
 
as groundwork for a literary tafsır of the Qur’anic text that was yet to be completed; 
given their substantial length, his engagement in them could be the reason why he never 
came to author any substantial work of tafsır adabı. 
 
Al-Khūlı’s literary approach represents one strand in the response of reformist Muslim 
scholars of the early twentieth century to the challenge of nineteenth century 
historicism, principally encountered in orientalism’s historical criticism of the Qur’an. 
This response, as exemplified by al-Khūlı, was focused on two major points. First, he 
recognised that the credibility of the Qur’an would be undermined if its narratives were 
subjected to the historical method, but this outcome could be counterbalanced based on 






should then be treated as literary devices and not as historical accounts.  It is for this 
reason that al-Khūlı often asserted that the contemporary study of the Qur’an should be 
‘purely and exclusively literary, unaffected by any consideration beyond that (ghayr 
muta√aththir bi-ayy i tib r war  dh lik)’,25 an idea that is reprehensible, for certain, to 
more conservative Muslim scholars.
26
 Second, a true understanding of the Qur’an as 
literary text is possible only through the application of the historicist principle according 
to which the meaning of a text is totally dependent on its history; hence al-Khūlı’s life-
time study of the historical context of the Qur’an.  
 
Although al-Khūlı expressed his awareness of the effect of history on reading the 
Qur’an when interpreters extend their personalities, prejudices and other interests onto 
the text,
27
 he expected his own approach to render a ‘true’ reading. Underlying this there 
is a positivist supposition that the scholar can be emancipated from historicity if s/he 
seeks ‘truth as it is, as it is reached and as it comes and not as he wants it, or desires it, 
or is prejudiced toward it.’28 Al-Khūlı calls this ‘the liberation of methods’ (ta˛rır al- 
man hij),
29
 which is only possible through a rigorous and systematic  
 ...compilation of all traditions and information about the subject of 
enquiry...and the critical examination of this vast corpus to purge it of the 
illusions of the infatuated, the grudges of the detesters, and the lies of the 
fabricators...which are rampant with prejudices.
30
  
The basic problem that al-Khūlı attempts to address in his work is a methodological 
one. To the end of salvaging Islamic thought, he dedicated his entire career to 
reconstructing a Muslim methodology upon scientific reasoning in order to minimise 
errors in understanding the truth of the Islamic message that was to be gleaned from the 
Qur’an. If the problem of the historical truth of Qur’anic narratives is precluded by 






method, purged of ‘religious prejudice’ and taking into account the historicity of the 
Qur’an itself, can produce accurate knowledge about its moral content. Equating truth 
with knowledge verified by a systematic method, al-Khūlı considered the readings 
resulting from the application of past non-empirical exegetical methods to be flawed 
and prejudiced. Although he insisted on the importance of ‘qa†l al-qadım ba˛than’31 as 
the first step in any programme of renewal, the literal meaning ‘killing the old 
[tradition] by research’ is not without resonance in this case. 
 
The methodological approach to renewal and to al-tafsır al-adabı proposed by al-Khūlı 
is representative of the appropriation in Muslim modernist thought both of the 
Enlightenment ideal of detached reason and its later tensions with historicism, i.e. the 
idea that understanding is conditioned by historical context. His proposed 
methodologies are clearly caught up in the broader nineteenth century project to resolve 
this tension by extending the model of the sciences to the humanities, giving rise to 
literary historicism in modern literary studies. But whereas his work may be seen in the 
final analysis as epitomising a theologically-motivated effort to overcome and transcend 
historicity by reifying method, the work of the contemporary proponent of al-tafsır al-
adabı Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd represents the reification of historicity itself and the total 
surrender to it; this is the opposite end of the scale, where the interpretation of the 
Qur’an cannot transcend its historical and cultural determinedness.32 
 
Bint al-Shā†i√’s place on this trajectory has been harder to determine, and her approach 
has been deemed anything from modern to anti-modernist. Her tafsır work is the most 






realisation of al-Khūlı’s tafsır methodology. In looking at her life and tafsır, her 
contribution and place as a twentieth century literary exegete will be reconsidered.   
 
Bint al-Shā†i√’s journey to Amın al-Khūlı  
Both Bint al-Shā†i√33 and Amın al-Khūlı continued Abduh’s reformism, which 
endeavoured to rework Islamic thought in relation to modernity by reviving an Islamic 
principle of rationality as the basis of knowledge within the framework of faith.
34
 Yet 
Bint al-Shā†i√ was unique, as a woman of the first generation of an emerging tradition of 
Arab women academics and intellectuals. Unlike many of her female peers, however, 
her intellectualism was not primarily formed within the secular educational system that 
was beginning to open up for girls at the time. Due to her lineage to a milieu of Azharı 
Shaykhs and instructors including the fifteenth Shaykh of al-Azhar, A˛mad al-
Damhüjı,35 Bint al-Shā†i√ was trained at home in the traditional religious and linguistic 
sciences from a very early age. She memorised the Qur’an at the local Qur’an school or 
kutt b before the age of ten, and spent much of her childhood in dedicated home study 
under the guidance of her father in the provincial Nile town Dimy †. It is against this 
background that Bint al-Shā†i√ was uniquely positioned to become the first Arab 
Muslim woman writer to venture into Qur’anic and religious scholarship before al-
Azhar opened its doors to women in 1962.  
 
Despite her father’s opposition to secular female education outside the home, Bint al-
Shā†i√ aspired to formal qualifications and pursued her education, but not without some 
tragic consequences within her family. After completing foundation-level teacher 






highest distinction at national level, from the advanced Teachers’ College (madrasat al-
mu allim t) in Manṣüra, only to discover afterwards that her teacher training did not 
qualify her to join the university, and that she had been trapped within a bifurcated 
educational system engendered by social and gender discrimination. Impelled toward 
the university, she laboured for seven years (1928-1935) as a full-time elementary 
teacher and distance-learning student, and succeeded in obtaining the equivalent 
certificates for primary and secondary education in a remarkable three years (1929-
1932). She was delayed from proceeding for a further three years, as university 
regulations prohibited distance-study, which she insisted upon out of fear of her father. 
A compromise was informally reached with the university, and in 1935 Bint al-Shā†i√ 
started a BA degree in Arabic.  
 
Despite her initial disillusionment with university education, which she considered 
unchallenging and fragmented compared to the epistemologically integrated religious 
sciences, her decision to withdraw was reversed after her first lecture with Amın al-
Khūlı. The encounter left her with a sense of the ‘real’ import of the modern concept of 
‘methodology’ which, until then, she had understood as madhhab (a school of thought), 
a term which had become associated with ideology and prejudice in reformist Muslim 
discourse. From then on Bint al-Shā†i√ became the most devoted advocate of al-Khūlı’s 
application of a modern methodology in literary studies. Due to university politics, 
however, she was prevented from studying under his supervision for her doctoral 
degree. Instead, she completed her thesis with the Egyptian thinker and academic ‡āhā 
˘usayn (d. 1973), known as the Dean of Arabic Letters. She was awarded a doctorate 
with distinction in 1950 for her dissertation entitled Risal t al-ghufr n li-Abı al- Al √ 






resumed the university career she had given up due to family reasons in 1944, taking up 
positions in Egypt and other Arab countries and eventually holding two prestigious 
chairs, first as Professor of Arabic at Ayn Shams University (1962-1970), and then as 
Professor of Tafsır and Advanced Studies at Qarawyyın University in Morocco from 
1970 until the early 1990s.  
Her writings   
Bint al-Shā†i√’s professional writing career began in women’s magazines in the early 
1930s, as the editor of Al-Nahḍa al-nisā√iyya (Women’s Renaissance),36 then as a 
contributor to the feminist magazine al-Miṣriyya (The Egyptian Woman) and a 
columnist in al-Ahr m newspaper for the rest of her life. She had a distinct style and an 
independent character which marked her writings, as well as her fierce intellectual 
debates with some of Egypt’s influential thinkers like Abb s Ma˛mūd al- Aqq d (d. 
1964)
37
 and Muṣ†af  Ma˛mūd (d. 2009).38 Her early writings in al-Ahr m were marked 
by an engagement with social issues.
39
 Informed by her rural background, her first two 
books al-Rıf al-Miṣrı (The Egyptian Countryside, 1936) and Qaḍiyyat al-fall ḥ (The 
Peasant Question, 1939) decried the poor conditions of Egyptian peasantry and the need 
for a state programme of reform and education appropriate to the rural context.
40
 These 
writings brought her to the fore of public debates on social issues of the time, earning 
her in 1936 the State Prize in the Social Sciences (for al-Rıf al-Miṣrı),41 and an offer to 




Despite the rapid fame her social commentary brought her, Bint al-Shā†i√’s dedication 
to academic research was affirmed after her encounter with al-Khūlı. He inspired her to 






literary appreciation of the Qur’an, culminating in her award-winning edition of al-
Ma arrı’s Ris lat al-ghufr n in 1950. Themes of peasant exploitation and social 
injustice recurred in her literary output of those years but with a strong focus on gender. 
Her 1942 novel, Sayyid al- izba: Qiṣṣat imra√a kh i√a (Lord of the Manor: The Story 
of a Sinful Woman) and her al-Hilāl periodical short stories, collected in 1952 in Sirr al-
Shā†i√ (The Secret of the Shore), deal with gender injustice, religious hypocrisy and 
moral corruption in Egyptian society. 
 
In the following decade, drawing upon her training in textual analysis of Islamic 
sources, her literary talent, and her interest in gender, Bint al-Shā†i√ produced a widely 
acclaimed series of biographies of early Muslim women, especially women of the 
Prophet’s household (Tar jim sayyid t bayt al-nubuwwa):43 Nis √ al-nabiyy (Wives of 
the Prophet, 1954), Ban t al-nabiyy (Daughters of the Prophet, 1956), Ba†alat Karbal √ 
(The Heroine of Karbal √, 1956), Umm al-nabiyy (Mother of the Prophet, 1956). She 
also worked on the biographies and literary trajectories of Sukayna bint al-˘usayn 
(n.d.), a poet and literary critic from the Prophet’s family,  al-Khans √ (1957), a poet 
and companion of the Prophet Muḥammad, and R bi a al- Adawiyya (1962), a famous 
Muslim ascetic and poet of the eighth century. These three later biographies shift the 
interest from women related to the Prophet to women associated with Arabic literature, 
shedding a contemporary light on the history of early Muslim women’s contribution to 
the formation of the Arabic language, and the intersection of their religious and literary 
identities in a way that seems to set precedent to Bint al-Shā†i√s own career.   
 
This biographical series became remarkably popular
44
 and firmly established Bint al-






proceeded in the 1960s to publish her famous studies of the Qur’an: al-Tafsır al-bayānı 
li’l-Qur n al-karım (The Literary Interpretation of the Qur’an) in two volumes (1962; 
1968) and al-I jāz al-bayānı li’l-Qur√ān wa-masā√il Nafi  ibn al-Azraq (The Qur’an’s 
Rhetorical Inimitability and the Questions of Nafi  ibn al-Azraq [the seventh century 
Khārijı leader who interroragted the early exegete Ibn Abb s on Qur’an exegesis], 
1971). It is in these works that Bint al-Shā†i√ presented to a wider audience an 
application of al-Khūlı’s tafsır methodology; this earned her an unprecedented place in 
Islamic studies in general and as the first mufassira in the tafsır genre.45 
 
Bint al-Shā†i√’s writings covered a broad range of literary, social and linguistic studies 
across more than sixty publications;
46
 those mentioned here are only the landmarks of 
her career. Including her tafsır, they addressed the major questions occupying Arab and 
Muslim intellectuals of the twentieth century. Her early work resonated with a rising 
feminist movement with which she had sympathies, though she never proclaimed 
herself a feminist. The ‘woman’ question remained an undercurrent in a great deal of 
her literary output, her biographical works, and even her tafsır studies, such as her 
excursus on the creation story in Maq l fi’l-insān (A Treatise on the Human Being, 
1969), where she rejected the view of male precedence in creation based on reading the 
Qur’an as emphasising the single origin of men and women,47 a reading that would 
become significant for later Muslim feminist hermeneutics.
48
 Her gender interest is also 
more directly addressed in two short treatises: al-Mar√a al-muslima ams wa’l-yawm 
(The Muslim Woman, Yesterday and Today, 1960?) and al-Mafhüm al-isl mı li-ta˛rır 







Bint al-Shā†i√’s work was also framed by other pressing issues of her time. Her writings 
on the Arabic language, for example, reflect an intellectual agenda seeking cultural 
authenticity and continuity with the past. This agenda acquired a nationalist tone during 
her years as Chair of Arabic at Ayn Shams University, which coincided with the height 
of the post-colonial Arab nationalism of the 1960s.
50
 The nationalist agenda coloured 
some of her other studies as well: in al-Tafsır al-bayānı, for example, al-Khūlı’s notion 
of the Qur’an as ‘kitāb al- arabiyya al-akbar’ takes on a new meaning as the locus of 
the linguistic and cultural unity of the Arabs and the source of ‘key solutions to many of 
the questions of our nationalist existence’.51 Bint al-Shā†i√’s unmistakable Arab and 
Islamic identity may suggest that her thought is bounded by intellectual and religious 
conservatism. In her writings, however, she emerges as a thinker with a complex 
message on the relation between modernity, the contemporary era and tradition; this is a 
message that is far more concerned with an intellectual originality rooted in tradition 
than with conserving the past for the sake of authenticity. The relation between past and 
present, exemplified in works such as Tur thun  bayn m ḍin wa- ḍir (1967), is 
perhaps the most pervasive theme in all her writings, not least in her tafsır work, as 
demonstrated below.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is ‘the first ever to be written by a woman’,52 and that it 
has gained a wide readership,
53
 Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır has not received the same 
attention in recent scholarship as other, more controversial, works of Qur’an 
interpretation. Her exegetical endeavour is often deemed to conform to al-Khūlı’s 
approach,
54
 offering ‘a reliable picture of what a Koran commentary by Amın al-Khūlı 
would have looked like.’55 This view may be justifiable in light of her own 






personal and poetic in her relationship with al-Khūlı as teacher and beloved husband.56 
Apart from a few brief published studies
57
 interested mainly in the methodical 
dimension of her tafsır (such as thematic and cross-referential techniques of 
interpretation), the degree of redirection and/or any creative shifts of emphases in her 
adaption of al-Khūlı’s method are yet to be fully investigated. 
 
In what follows some light will be shed on this issue. Three hermeneutic questions that 
arise in any process of interpretation, viz. authority, understanding and application, will 
be considered in relation to Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır work, in light of other intersecting 
questions about tradition, language and gender. It is important to note that Bint al-Shā†i√ 
only very briefly outlines her approach in her introductions to the two volumes of al-
Tafsır al-bayānı. However, when read alongside her exegesis, and against some of her 
other writings, genuine hermeneutic insights related to these three questions can be 
traced in these introductory expositions. To situate the discussion in her own tafsır 
work, the following sections focus on her treatment of two verses from the first volume 
of al-Tafsır al-bayānı, Q. 102:8 and Q. 90:4 (Bint al-Shā†i√ preserves the ancient 
structure of verse-by-verse interpretation in her treatment of each of the fourteen 
Meccan suras in the two volumes of al-Tafsır al-bayānı).58 
 
2  Authority and tradition in Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır 
Then, on that day, you will be asked concerning na ım. (thumma la-tus√alunna 
yawma√i÷in an al-na ım, Q. 102:8) 
Bint al-Shā†i√ begins by outlining the exegetical disagreement on ‘the question 
concerning na ım’ in this verse. She finds the preoccupation of past exegetes with the 






explicit intention of the Qur’an on this occasion, deflecting attention from the 
questioner to the question itself.
59
 The word na ım, she notes, has given rise to multiple 
interpretations. Citing al-Fakhr al-R zı (d.606/1209), she lists nine possible readings:  
 The least of which is [the pleasure of] having slippers, and the highest is the 
Prophet…and between the two come the alleviation of [the strictness of] divine 
laws; the giving of the Qur’an; sustenance, drink and dwelling; soundness of 
body, hearing and sight; the cool shade; leisure, safety and comfort; the 
pleasure of slumber; affluence, and good looks.
60
 
Bint al-Shā†i√ cites extensively the evidence which past exegetes garnered from the 
Qur’an, ˘adıth and authoritative exegetical traditions. She examines the Arabic 
lexicons, concluding that na ım does, in fact, signify various meanings, such as leisurely 
living, wealth, generosity, and the splendour of gardens.
61
 This last meaning, she 
believes, could be its original one, given that the first form of the verb na ima, in 
reference to a wooden branch, indicates its becoming green. Na ım could also be used 
metonymically to signify religion, guidance, shade, wellbeing, and slumber. 
 
Although Bint al-Shā†i√ concedes that na ım may be polysemic and thus accepts its 
semantic variance, which is attested by extra-Qur’anic textual and lexical evidence, she 
is concerned that the specific Qur’anic context cannot possibly permit these 
irreconcilable meanings. Critical of past exegetes’ inattentiveness to this problem, she 
asks disparagingly: ‘But could the elevated phrasing of the Qur’an sustain such variety 
in one context?’62 Her concern does not arise because of the polysemy of the word 
na ım or an absence of exegetical preference, however, for she goes on to record several 
exegetical decisions on this word. For example, al-‡abarı (d. 310/922) preferred to 
restrict it to worldly pleasures, al-R zı extended it to all blessings and bounties, arguing 
that its grammatical definiteness indicates inclusivity (l m al-istighr q), al-Zamakhsharı 






verse as addressing one who devotes himself to such pleasures), and lastly al-R ghib al-
Iṣfah nı (d.  502/1108) paraphrased na ım as ‘plentiful bounties’.63 
 
This exegetical polyvalence is not in itself problematic; for Bint al-Shā†i√ it is rather the 
wide discrepancy between the available readings, inadvertently obscuring and 
fragmenting the meaning of the Qur’anic text, that demands attention. In order to 
reclaim the ‘true’ meaning, she proposes to reinstate the text as the final authority 
attesting its own meaning: ‘In the face of such variance…such inconsistency whereby 
the word na ım is interpreted once as the slippers or the shade, another time as the 
Prophet, and a third time as all the bounties of this world...we seek refuge in the Qur’an 
and judgment from it concerning that on which they disagree.’64  
 
The judgement of the Qur’an is then elicited by cross-referencing all nominal 
derivatives of N- -M occurring in the Qur’an (i.e. ni ma, ni m √, an um, and ni am), 
demonstrating that, at all times, they signify the bounties of this world. The consequent 
investigation of na ım reveals that its other fifteen occurrences specifically refer to the 
Hereafter often in the formula ‘the pleasure of paradise’ (jannat al- na ım).65 In contrast 
to the disagreement among past exegetes and the disparity of their readings, the Qur’an 
thus determinedly and consistently specifies na ım as ‘the pleasures of the Hereafter’;66 
as Bint al-Shā†i√ observes, this is the only meaning they never mentioned.  
 
Bint al-Shā†i√ describes the reading rendered by this systematic review of na ım in its 
various Qur’anic contexts as ‘˛ukm al-Qur√ān’ (the judgment of the Qur’an),67 before 
which the exegete, she argues, is no longer free to choose between other lexical or 






henceforth resolved by the Qur’an’s adjudication: ‘In the light of the Qur’an’s guidance, 
which strictly uses the word form na ım exclusively to refer to the Hereafter, and not 
ni ma, ni mā√, an um, or ni am, we can only understand the divine question in Q. 102:8 
as concerning the pleasures of the Hereafter.’68 
 
The meaning of na ım now pinned down, Bint al-Shā†i√ immediately turns her attention 
to the thematic linkages between this final verse of Sürat al-Tak thur and the earlier 
verses. She sees here an opportune moment to examine such ‘mysteries of the Qur’an’s 
eloquence’69. The primary theme uniting the whole sura70 can be summed up as follows: 
those engrossed in multiplying their material gain and transient worldly pleasures (Q. 
102:1) will be asked in the Hereafter, when they have seen Hellfire and become certain 
of it (Q. 102:2-7), about the real and lasting pleasure (Q. 102:8). The eloquence of 
expression in Q. 102:8, Bint al-Shā†i√ explains, is that the question concerning the ‘true’ 
pleasure of paradise occurs only in the Hereafter, when indubitable knowledge and 
certainty are possible. The warning in this question is therefore perfectly fitting to the 
tone of admonition that dominates the whole sura.
71
 Bint al-Shā†i√ concludes that with 
this understanding of Q. 102:8, the interconnectedness and coherence of the sura’s 
verses is revealed, and past interpretations which have obfuscated the exegetes’ grasp of 
‘the secrets of expression in this lasting literary miracle’ can finally be set aside.72  
 
If from the outset Bint al-Shā†i√ had aimed to set aside past interpretations, why are they 
discussed at such length in her interpretation of Q. 102:8, as elsewhere in her tafsır? 






The place of tradition in Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır has been the subject of cursory 
explanations in recent scholarship, where it is often reiterated that she aimed at 
discounting the interpretations of past exegetes on literary grounds,
73
 by subjecting 
them to a ‘rigorous analysis’ in light of the findings of her deductive method.74 
Considering Bint al-Shā†i√’s pronounced critique of the exegetical tradition’s 
‘juxtaposition of mutually exclusive meanings’,75 exemplified in her interpretation of Q. 
102:8, it is not implausible to see her engagement with it as a strategy to clear the way 
for a true and unclouded understanding of the Qur’an, and establish her own exegetical 
authority. In a textual religious tradition like Islam the acquisition of interpretative 
authority is crucial if a new reading of the founding text is to gain a place in the 
community. In the tafsır genre, authority is traditionally acquired through expression of 
belonging to the historical interpretative community in the form of citations of available 
interpretations of past generations. The citation process, however, does not entail 
agreeing with the past. In the first place, it is a declaration of allegiance to the 
predecessors. Through the ‘selection, presentation, and organisation of citations’, old 
readings continue to re-surface, ensuring variety while at the same time allowing the 
exegete to exercise creativity.
76
 The legitimacy and authority of an exegetical work does 
not depend only on loyalty to past opinions, but is also derived from the exegete’s 
engagement with the sanctioned linguistic and theological disciplines. Through their 
demonstration of knowledge and hermeneutic perceptiveness in applying these 
disciplines to the Qur’anic text the individual exegete’s contribution becomes 
authorised as ‘new’, rather than being a mere repetition of past opinions. At the same 










Bint al-Shā†i√’s treatment of Q. 102:8 is illustrative of how she establishes her authority 
as an exegete along these familiar lines. Like her predecessors who authored traditional 
works of tafsır, she continues to incorporate past interpretations through a process of 
citations and the naming of authorities, from the earliest to the most recent generations. 
Even though she singles out one reading as the most sound, other readings are still cited 
in her work. Through her attention to and representation of traditional exegesis, Bint al-
Shā†i√ thus derives authority, as earlier exegetes did, by demonstrating erudite 
knowledge and exercising selection and reorganisation of the tradition’s detail and 
variety. Yet as she pays allegiance to the past in this way, she does not remain in awe of 
its authority.
78
 For although like her predecessors she emphasises that the Qur’an must 
be read with the assistance of language, grammar and rhetoric,
79
 unlike them, she 
excludes the more theologically-oriented disciplines (of kalām, fiqh and taṣawwuf), and 
applies her linguistic knowledge with careful and marked determination to delineate the 
limitations of the exegetical tradition’s readings of the Qur’an. 
 
In her introduction to the third edition of al-Tafsır al-bayānı I, Bint al-Shā†i√ suggests 
that the ad seriatum hermeneutical form which the tradition followed unquestioningly in 
its treatment of the Qur’an in fact hindered achievement of a more coherent elucidation 
of its meaning. In contrast to this decontextualised, piecemeal approach, she describes 
her own tafsır as being based on al-Khūlı’s thematic method; this investigates the 
meaning of a Qur’anic word or expression by excavating its earliest connotation (al-
dal la al-lughawiyya al-aṣıla), which is then measured against Qur’anic usage, both in 
the immediate context of the verse and sura under consideration and in the larger 
context of the whole Qur’an, by cross-examining all its occurrences therein.80 This 






verse-by-verse approach. It relies on a contemporary literary and linguistic method 
rather than on past readings, and is, therefore, ‘entirely different from the established 
way’.81 In her view, the established way is beset by a flawed method that has permitted 
sectarian sensibilities and extraneous material, such as the isr √ıliyy t, to direct 
Qur’anic interpretation. In the absence of a sound method past exegetes, according to 
Bint al-Shā†i√, could not overcome the constraints resulting from:  
...variation in their tastes, mentalities, milieus and personalities in the wide 
Islamic world extending from China and India in the far East to Marrakech and 
Andalusia in the far West, a world divided by doctrinal, political and sectarian 
intolerance. This has inevitably led to diverse nations and sects reflecting on 
Islam’s religious book [the Qur’an] in light of their own specific circumstances 
and settings. Those among them who interpreted it did so in a manner which, 
more often than not, lacked a sound sense of the Arabic language and its 
essential rules and structures.
82
  
Methodologically, Bint al-Shā†i√ distanciates her approach from that of traditional tafsır, 
yet textually she continues to re-engage with it throughout the two volumes of al-Tafsır 
al-bayānı, where almost on every page there appears the name of a classical exegete, 
grammarian, and/or rhetorician. The sustained intensity of this textual representation 
exceeds considerations of ‘tactical necessity’83 or the requirements of authority 
formation. Despite the overt critique, the degree and scope of engagement imply a 
profound sense of the tradition’s significance. Bint al-Shā†i√ hints at her complex 
relation with traditional tafsır in her preliminary affirmation in the first volume that ‘No 
fair-minded [reader/interpreter] dares to be ungrateful to the contribution of any one of 
all those [past authorities] who exerted great efforts in the service of the Qur’an and left 
their legacies for the nurture of generations.’84 
 
Published five years after al-Tafsır al-bayānı, her autobiography Ala al-Jisr (1967) is 






the university and modern academia, in which themes of identity preservation, 
commitment to the past, and the pressures of change predominate. Here Bint al-Shā†i√ 
depicts her persistent efforts to overcome her cultural and intellectual alienation, as she 
reluctantly relocated from rural Egypt to urban and class-prejudiced Cairene society to 
pursue higher education at King Fu√ d I University during the early 1930s.85 She 
recounts that her early ambivalence toward the ‘modern methods’ imparted at the 
university was due to her fear of becoming estranged from the past authorities of the 
hermeneutic and linguistic traditions often referred to in her account as the family and 
kin whose company she had kept since her early days at her father’s religious 
seminary.
86
 It is not until the encounter with al-Khūlı that her ambivalence gives way to 
confidence in the new systematic method of reading, which would open up her horizons 
beyond the ‘insular walls’ of her previous epistemological stance,87 according to which 
she had deemed the tradition to be the epitome of all knowledge: ‘And so did the 
University give me of her new ways [jadıdah ] what I had never imagined. And the old 
[al-qadım] that I brought her began to be polished [when subjected to] the methodology 
of Professor al-Khūlı.’88 
 
This message concerning the importance of tradition is re-expressed soon after in al-
Tafsır al-bayānı II (1968). Here Bint al-Shā†i√ stresses at the outset that her systematic 
method of reading the Qur’an continues to benefit from her reading of past exegetes.89 
Yet her recognition of their worth does not preclude a critical analysis, which often 
reveals the inadequacies of these efforts for a contemporary understanding of the 
Qur’an. Nor does her critique presuppose the obliteration of this tradition as its 
outcome. Quite the contrary, her reading of the Qur’an is invigorated by an ongoing 






of the Qur’an, accepting [the opinion] that is textually and contextually sustainable, then 
recording all the other opinions that the text rejects, drawing attention to their 
inconsistency, contrivance, or arbitrariness.
90
 This dialogue with the tradition is, 
perhaps, the most noticeable discursive feature of al-Tafsır al-bayānı. It follows a 
rhythmic pattern of climaxing toward dismantling the past interpretive tradition prior to 
presenting her own reading (as discussed above in the case of Q. 102:8, for example), 
only to climb down again and foreground that very tradition as the terrain from which 
she begins her treatment of the following verse or sura. In this process the dialogue 
becomes a constitutive structure of the reading itself, a point pursued further below.  
 
Construed through a Gadamerian lens, this dialogue discloses a consciousness of the 
hermeneutic process not far from Gadamer’s insight that ‘Even where life changes 
violently, as in the ages of revolution, far more of the old is preserved in the 
transformation of everything than anyone knows, and combines with the new to create a 
new value’. 91 Tradition is, in this sense, always constitutive of the prior knowledge an 
exegete brings to a hermeneutic situation. It is the place where an exegete already 
stands. To recognise this locatedness is neither regression to the past nor self-subjection 
to something other or alien, but a choice, and hence ‘an act of reason, though an 
inconspicuous one’,92 to recognise that the language we speak is already constituted by 
tradition. This recognition is not an opposition to change but an understanding of 










In this light, Bint al-Shā†i√’s contemporary tafsır which begins from the terrain of the 
tradition represents a hermeneutic choice not to premise her reading on obliteration but 
on recognition of the tafsır tradition as the primary source for her cultural and 
intellectual formation, and hence as the place where she stood prior to approaching the 
Qur’an with new ways of understanding. Not only so, but her competence in 
understanding the language of tradition, which she deemed the grounds for her 
authority
94
 and the very mark of her distinctness amongst her contemporaries,
95
 enabled 
her to engender a dialogue between past (readings) and present (ways of reading). This 
dialogical hermeneutic of al-Tafsır al-bayānı consequently allows the presence of the 
past to be textually represented and hence symbolically re-affirmed, while at the same 
time intellectually re-evaluated. In this manner, Bint al-Shā†i√ neither abandons past 
authorities (as she once feared),
96
 nor does she waste the moment of the new reading.  
Transcending the tradition 
Key to the double movement of reaffirmation and re-evaluation of tradition is the role of 
the Qur’an as adjudicator, a role which is made possible by Bint al-Shā†i√’s commitment 
to applying an old hermeneutic principle, ‘the Qur’an interprets itself (al-Qur√ān 
yufassiru ba ḍuhu ba ḍan)’; a principle developed but never fulfilled by past authorities 
because of their piecemeal approach to the Qur’an.97 The case of na m in Q. 102:8 
demonstrates how she transforms this principle into a framework for the cross-
examination of intertextual (across suras) and intratextual (within a particular sura) 
relations by means of which the Qur’an’s judgment can be elicited against the variant 
and inconsistent readings offered by the tradition. The ensuing reading, presented as the 
Qur’an’s judgement (˛ukm al-Qur n), is legitimated by invoking the authority of the 






defines her whole endeavour as directed by ‘Seeking judgement [mu˛takima] from it 
alone... guided by the meticulous examination of its lexicon, thoughtful consideration of 
its context, and contemplative listening to the intimations of expression in this unique 
type of inimitable eloquence.’98 In the introduction of the third edition Bint al-Shā†i√ 
again sums up this approach, as follows: 
In understanding the secrets of its expression we seek judgment (na˛takimu) on 
the basis of the textual context, complying by what its text and spirit can 
sustain. We lay before it the opinions of the exegetes, accepting what the text 
accepts and avoiding what has been imposed in tafsır books of the intrusive 
isr √ıliyy t [material] and sectarian interpretations. 
In addition, we seek judgement (na˛takimu) from our greatest Book to direct 
the analysis of its syntax and the subtleties of its eloquence. We measure the 
rules of the grammarians and rhetoricians against the Book, but we do not 
measure the Book against such rules, which were set by scholars the majority 
of whom were new to the Arabic language and did not acquire its [native] taste 
and spontaneity, even though they may have mastered the knowledge and 
artistry of the language.
 99
 
The choice of the term i˛tik m by an attentive philologist like Bint al-Shā†i√ to describe 
the direction of her cross-referential method cannot be random. The term, which 
originally signifies seeking the judgment of a ruler or arbitrator, articulates a message 
considerably different from that of the old principle of the Qur’an interpreting itself. 
Bint al-Shā†i√’s consistent recourse to al-i˛tik m ila’l-Qur n transforms the Qur’an’s 
place in the hermeneutic process from being, in the first place, an ‘object of 
interpretation’ and, in the second, one of several competing interpretative resources, into 
the sole adjudicator of its own meaning and the horizon for re-evaluating the tradition. 
It is also through the process of i˛tik m that Bint al-Shā†i√ opens up the tradition for 
critical assessment in light of the reading indicated by the Qur’an itself, so as to 








For an exegete whose self-authentication is premised upon a sense of belonging to past 
generations of the interpretative community,
100
 moving beyond the boundaries and 
authority of their permitted readings requires a manner of legitimization that would be 
meaningful to those who belong to the tradition, thereby permitting its expansion to 
incorporate the new reading. Bint al-Shā†i√ therefore deliberately eschews laying claim 
to an individually generated contemporary reading that breaks from and attempts to 
substitute for the experiences of past generations. Instead, she becomes the conduit and 
facilitator for the Qur’an’s agency as the ultimate interpretive authority for i) measuring 
the efforts of the tradition in grasping Qur’anic meaning, and ii) generating a new 
reading when the tradition’s failure is demonstrated. Only thus can the authority of the 
past readings be overshadowed. At the same time the method of i˛tik m, itself rooted in 
the tafsır tradition, maintains continuity, as it presupposes the presence of tradition for 
re-evaluation. Hence the tradition’s meta-message about the significance of the literary 
engagement with generations of exegetes is also re-articulated, while the potential for 
transcending their definition of the Qur’an’s meaning is effected. 
 
Further, by rooting the legitimacy of the new reading in the authority of the Qur’an, 
Bint al-Shā†i√ circumvents the risk to her own identity, authority and standing as a 
modern exegete grounded in tradition. She also carves out a space for herself as the first 
woman exegete (mufassira) to author a tafsır – and, to date, one of few modern exegetes 




Bint al-Shā†i√’s place as the first mufassira calls for some consideration here before it 






of her endeavour to assist the Qur’an’s agency within the tafsır tradition, where 
women’s exegetical agency was on the whole constrained, particularly in its written 
articulation. Salient in her application of i˛tik m is her avoidance of the term ijtih d 
(independent reasoning), a term which acquired much currency in twentieth century 
Muslim discourses on the necessity to bracket and/or discard tradition to achieve a 
rational subjectivity. In contradistinction to ijtih d in its modern rendition as a concept 
privileging the exegete as the autonomous rational subject on the one hand, and the text 
as the object of interpretation on the other,
101
 al-i˛tik m ila’l-Qur n is suggestive of a 
reciprocal agency, whereby the exegete surrenders herself to the text and the text, in 
return, surrenders its meaning to her.
102
 The outcome is that the interpretive agency of 




The terms of reference for the process of i˛tik m attest to this understanding. Bint al-
Shā†i√ does not subject ‘the Book’ to the opinions and rules set by the (male) exegetes. 
As a corollary, neither is her reading subjected to their authority and knowledge, though 
it is grounded in them. Her reading is the outcome of her commitment to ‘contemplative 
listening to the intimations of [the Qur’an’s] expression’, thus allowing the text itself to 
speak,
104
 and to present its meaning as its ‘gift’ ( a ih) to the receiving mufassira.105 
A sense of fluid and reciprocated agency is also implicit in Bint al-Shā†i√’s use of the 
term istiqr √ (literally, denoting a request for a reading) to refer to the cross-
examination of Qur’anic terms, expressions and stylistic phenomena which she employs 
to systematise al-i˛tik m.106 But the ultimate outcome of this intimate conversation with 
the Qur’an, the text that transcends all exegetical texts in that it is also the horizon of 






subject in this conversation, transcends the historical horizon of this tradition and the 
condition of women’s constrained presence in it.   
 
3  Understanding, language and humanity in Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır 
We have created the human being [al-insān] in kabad. (laqad khalaqn  al-insān  
fı kabad, Q 90:4) 
In dealing with this verse,  Bint al-Shā†i√ sets out two queries: the referent of al-insān, 
and the precise signification of kabad, a word which presents a special hermeneutic 
challenge to her cross-referential method since it does not occur elsewhere in the 
Qur’an, neither in this form nor in a derivative one. Insān, on the other hand, occurs 
sixty five times, and establishing its reference to humankind in general becomes the 
way by which Bint al-Shā†i√ produces a certain contextual understanding of the 
Qur’an’s unique usage of kabad. 
 
Bint al-Shā†i√ adduces support for her reading of the Qur’anic usage of insān as 
representing a concept of humanity by citing Abū ˘ayy n al-Gharn ’s (d. 745/1344) 
report of the majority agreement that al-insān (sing.) refers to humankind. Though the 
contextual reading may suggest it, and the tradition supports it, there is no evident 
textual proof for this meaning in contrast to the case of the word na‛ım, where Qur’anic 
usage indicated its referentiality to paradise. The inductive reading (istiqrā√) of al-insān 
as humankind hinges upon her further grammatical analysis: The definite article al, 
which has several grammatical functions, defines genus in Q. 90:4, as in the other sixty 
three Qur’anic occurrences of al-insān. The exceptional occurrence in the indefinite 






still implies the inclusivity of genus due to the preceding kull (every).
107
 Accordingly, 
Bint al-Shā†i√ rejects108 dissenting interpretations which restrict the referent of al-insān 
to only those afflicted with a disease of the heart amongst the children of Adam 
(because of al-insān’s occurrence with the word kabad signifying pain or disease) (al-
Zamakhsharı) or to Adam himself ( Abd al-Ra˛m n Ibn Zayd [d. 182/798]).109  
 
Summing up several concurrent studies, Bint al-Shā†i√ then offers a compressed 
treatment of all sixty-five instances of insān,110 referring the reader to her detailed 
discussion in al-Tafsır al-bayānı II.111 Here she insists that the humanity signified by al-
insān is quite distinct from that signified by other, overlapping, Qur’anic terms, such as 
damiyya and insiyya. Rather, al-insān denotes a higher mode of existence that qualifies 
the human being for his/her role as God’s vicegerent: 
 The inductive reading of all the verses of insān in the noble Qur’an shows that 
the sense of humanness it signifies is more specific than the meaning of an 
Adamic species ( damiyya) or non-savagery (insiyya).
112
 The human being is 
uniquely endowed with the abilities of clarification (bayān) and 
argumentation,
113





 the covenant and entrustment;
116
 the trials of good and evil
117
 
and exposure to temptation,
118
 not to mention the arrogance, tyranny and sense 
of self-sufficiency
119
 that are part of the human condition.
120
 
Turning her attention to the etymology of kabad, which means pain (originally from 
kabid, liver pain), Bint al-Shā†i√ confirms that it came to connote hardship and difficulty 
in general.
121
 On this too, she states, exegetes are in agreement, but they diverge beyond 
this point of consensus on the nature of the hardship that humankind has to bear. In her 
measured consideration of both the exegetical discourse and Qur’anic context, Bint al-
Shā†i√ listens carefully to possible cues, which signal her subsequent conclusion that 
‘The meaning of kabad we prefer is that of bearing the responsibility and difficulty of 







Guided toward this meaning by her understanding of al-insān as humankind, and of 
kabad as primarily signifying hardship, Bint al-Shā†i√ contends with al-Zamakhsharı’s 
interpretation, which arises from his Mu tazilı position against a predestinarian literal 
reading of Q. 90:4 where kabad is taken to mean disease. Such a reading would be   
used as evidence that humankind is predestined to suffer because of an innate 
corruption. As a theological counter, al-Zamakhsharı’ restricts the referent of the verse 
to those human beings God already knew would choose not to be good.
123
  Although 
Bint al-Shā†i√ concludes in the end that the Qur’an is supportive of the principle of 
freewill, she is critical of how al-Zamakhsharı’s ideological horizon thwarts the 
meaning of the text: 
Al-Zamakhsharı, directed by his Mu tazilism, claims that it means: ‘we have 
created the human being [afflicted with] disease; that is [moral] disease in the 
heart and inner corruption.’ He then realises that this interpretation provokes 
the question of accountability and recompense...since the creator here is God, 
then it is He who created the human being with sickness in the heart and inner 
corruption. So [al-Zamakhsharı] pre-emptively states: ‘[God]…is referring to 
those He already knew, when He created them, would not believe or do good 
deeds.’ According to this the definite article al in al-insān is for designation, 
and not for the all-inclusiveness of genus [a meaning] endorsed by the context 
of the verse and corroborated by the Qur’anic usage of the word al-insān in the 
generic sense of humankind, upon which the majority of exegetes [agree], as 
Abū ˘ayy n explicitly states in al-Ba˛r [al-mu˛ı†].124 
The removal of the tradition’s ideologically-framed reading of kabad, represented by al-
Zamakhsharı, is effected not by reading kabad itself, a word which has no other 
Qur’anic occurrence, but by the intersection Bint al-Shā†i√ skilfully constructs here 
between the Qur’an’s generic usage of insān and the interpretation of it as signifying 
genus, which she casts as the ‘general agreement’ within the tradition. The tradition in 
this case complements the procedure of inductive cross-referencing (istiqrā√); the 






(Mu tazilı) reading of kabad (as the moral disease of some human beings). Even the 
tradition’s variant readings of kabad, presented thereafter, are incorporated with the 
purpose of grounding her final reading of the verse as referring to human responsibility:  
And in al-Tiby n [fı tafsır al-Qur n by Abū Ja al-‡üsı d. 460/1067]: ‘Of 
all that God created, none suffer like the children of Adam…On the authority 
of Sa d b. Abı al-˘asan125: [the human being] suffers the adversities of life 
and the hardships of the Hereafter.’  
Also in al-Tiby n: ‘on the authority of Ibn Abb s, the meaning intended in 
kabad is [the condition of] being conceived, born, breastfed and weaned; and 
then enduring teething, living, subsisting and dying, all of which are hardships.  
Ibn al-Qayyim [al-Jawziyya d. 751/1350]
126
 further explicated that: ‘The 
human being is created in hardship; that is his being in the womb, then [as an 
infant] in the swaddle then in the straps. He then encounters great danger 
once he reaches the age of accountability and suffers the hardships of living 
and upholding [God’s] commands and prohibitions. (Emphasis added) Then 
he endures death, the waiting in the grave, the rising on Judgement Day and the 
torment of the Hellfire. There is no solace but in paradise.’  
Shaykh Muḥammad Abduh said ‘He [the human being] toils as he exerts his 
energies at work. [He] even toils when he eats, drinks or protects his family 
amongst his group.’127  
The inclusion of opinions from Ibn Abb s to Abduh suggests coverage of the full 
spectrum of meanings, from the earliest to the most recent exegetes. Yet a closer look 
shows that these variant interpretations of kabad, some of which are cited from less 
commonly-used tafsırs such as that of Ibn al-Qayyim, are purposefully selected by Bint 
al-Shā†i√ to pinpoint a consensus on i) the idea that the hardship intended by the word 
kabad is specific to being human, and that the majority link it with ii) the Hereafter. 
This account of ‘possible interpretations’ implies a convergence toward Bint al-Shā†i√’s 
own reading of kabad as signifying the human being’s responsibility of choosing 
between good and evil, which has a bearing on his/her final place in the Hereafter, a 
reading already prefigured, though not fully developed, in almost similar terms by Ibn 







The effect of this is that Bint al-Shā†i√’s interpretation of kabad, which anchors her 
understanding of human ontology in the Qur’an, is presented not as alien to the history 
of tafsır, but as the culmination of a reading that has long been in the process of 
formation.  A further effect of this intricate imbrication of her interpretation in the tafsır 
tradition is that the tradition emerges as having been partially successful in listening to 
‘the intimations of the Qur’an’, in so far as it has attended to the smaller constituents of 
the verse, such as the words al-insān and kabad. What was never successfully 
addressed, in her view, is the intra-textual connection between Q. 90:4 and the rest of 
the sura. In the final part of her discussion she throws the following question at the 
tradition: ‘What then is the linkage between the oath by the city [Q. 90:1-2 ‘No! I swear 
by this city, the city in which you dwell’] and the begetter and what he begot [Q. 90:3], 
and by the hardship in which the human being was created and his inevitable suffering 
from his birth hour to Judgement Day [Q. 90:4]?’128 The only answer she hears back is 
one attempted at the dawn of the tradition’s encounter with modernity, by Abduh. 
However, in her assessment, Abduh’s answer is inadequate. 
 
Like al-Zamakhshari, she argues, Abduh imposes a restrictive horizon by interpreting 
the context of kabad on the basis of a possible historical allusion to the Meccans’ 
violation of the sanctity of the Prophet in Q. 90:2.  To support this interpretation, Q. 
90:2 has to be read as ‘the city in which you are [˛ill] violated’, and not as ‘the city in 
which you are [˛ill] dwelling’. Bint al-Shā†i√ indeed accepts the possibility of an 
allusion to the Prophet’s Meccan situation, but she is not the least persuaded by 
Abduh’s elaboration that the intention of the sura was to console the Prophet when he 
suffered abuse and rejection in Mecca, by reminding him that the violation endured by 






since hardship (kabad) afflicts all begetters (to whom Q. 90:3 refers), including al-insān 
(Q. 90:4), in raising their offspring, and the offspring in reaching maturity.
129
 Bint al-
Shā†i√ categorically rejects Abduh’s narrow historical anchoring of the contextual 
meaning of kabad.  
Just as she removed the ideological horizon imposed by al-Zamakhsharı on the words 
insān and kabad, she removes the historical horizon which Abduh imposed on the 
context, by dismantling the logic of his reading: 
The incongruity of this interpretation comes from equating the burdens of 
prophethood with the hardship an offspring endures in order to grow. The 
opinion we have reached is that the Imam [ Abduh], God’s mercy upon him, 
has gone too far in his generalisation, extending the phrase ‘what he begot’ in 
the verse [Q. 90:3] to include the offspring of man, animal and plant. Leaving 
aside [a comparison with] plant seeds and various species of animals and 
insects, can the great burdens of messengerhood actually be equated with what 
afflicts every human born?
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For Bint al-Shati, the failure of the tradition, including Abduh, to attend appropriately 
to the textual context of this sura prevents the tradition from grasping the linguistic and 
theological consequences of understanding the hardship (kabad) humanity has to bear. 
This failure justifies, for Bint al-Shā†i√, the rejection of any of the tradition’s further 
particularisations of the meaning of kabad as hardship, be that semantic (e.g. hardships 
of life and its different stages), ideological (moral corruption in some human beings), or 
historical (the hardships of the Prophet Muḥammad in Mecca). Hearing in the sura a 
more general discourse on humankind (strongly indicated in the following verses, which 
refer to the human being’s misguided arrogance [Q. 90:5-7] and to faculties of 
perception and discernment [Q. 90:8-9]), Bint al-Shā†i√ prefers to understand kabad as 
bearing the difficult responsibility of choosing between good and evil. This is a reading 






‘and We guided him on the two paths [al-najdayn]’ as referring to the paths of good and 
evil.’  
The answer Bint al-Shā†i√ provides to her earlier question regarding the linkage between 
creating humankind in hardship (Q. 90:4) and the oath of the preceding verses is that the 
oath demonstrates the enormity of the wrongs committed by the people of Mecca (Q. 
90:1), one generation after the other (Q. 90:3),
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 and that these wrongs, including their 
violation of the sanctity of the Prophet (Q. 90:2), are of their own choice, for which they 





Returning finally to the first word of Q. 90:4 ‘We have created [khalaqn ] the human 
being in hardship’, Bint al-Shā†i√ attempts to dispense with the spectre of the debate 
between the Mu tazila and the Mujabbira, which tied the interpretation of the verse to 
two opposite theological positions on free will. Against this theological disagreement, 
which, in her view, hampered an understanding of the Qur’an’s perspective on human 
responsibility, Bint al-Shā†i√ advances a contextual reading of ‘created’ in hardship 
(kabad)’ as indicating our ‘innate preparedness’ to bear the responsibility of choosing 
between good and evil and not a condition of preordained suffering. In this way, the 
verse need not be restricted to those with ‘disease of the heart’ in order to assert freewill 
(the interpretation of the Mu tazila), and its general linguistic meaning can prevail 
without lending support to the predestinarian (Mujabbira) interpretation:     
 As for God’s saying…‘We have created (khalaqn )’ instead of ‘We have 
given/made (ja aln )’, this indicates that the human being is created with an 
innate preparedness [emphasis added] for this hardship as understood in terms 
of enduring [human] responsibility and obligations, and the burden of choosing 
good or evil. There remains no need for the theological debates stirred by the 






follow thus clarify the hardship (kabad) in which the human being is created, 





Although Bint al-Shā†i√’s strategy of al-i˛tik m li’l-Qur n  demonstrated in light of her 
interpretation of Q. 102:8 stresses subjugation of the tafsır tradition, her interpretation 
of Q. 90:4 reveals how the dialogue with this tradition is nevertheless fundamental to 
her interpretative effort. In its most basic definition this effort is ‘no more than an 
endeavour for understanding (mu wala li’l-fahm)’,134 an endeavour that has been 
shown to take place within Bint al-Shā†i√s community of exegetes and through 
participation in a conversation that has already begun on the meaning of insān and the 
hardship (kabad) s/he bears. What these two terms do or do not signify is constituted as 
the conversation unfolds: supporting (e.g. al-insān as genus), implying (e.g. kabad as 
the hardship of human accountability and choice) and eliminating (ideological or 
historical) particularisations of meaning all take place within this conversation. Even 
where the pursuit of an interpretation of the textual context of Q. 90:4 is legitimated by 
the tradition’s meagre contribution in this respect (only Abduh), the contextual reading 
at which Bint al-Shā†i√ arrives is predicated as much on the cross-referential method as 
it is on the tradition’s efforts at the lexical and grammatical levels of the key terms of 
the verse.  
 
Bint al-Shā†i√’s textual representation of her dialogue with the tafsır tradition may be 
controlled and directed yet it also gestures at an extending conversation where the 
Qur’an is consciously established as the hermeneutic horizon for enquiry. Against this 
horizon, Bint al-Shā†i√ brings about the fusion of tradition with contemporary method, 






example), and to remove unproductive horizons for enquiry, whether they be 
ideological formulations or intrusive historical material generated outside the world of 
the text.
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Language and understanding  
In these multiple textual conversations language, for Bint al-Shā†i√, is at the core of the 
hermeneutic endeavour. The quest for ‘words that clarify by way of explication and 
approximation’ is the process whereby an understanding is achieved and articulated but 
also, because of which, this understanding remains inadequate.
136
 It is this inadequacy 
that, in her view, incites further hermeneutic involvement and drives the continuing 
production of tafsır works by successive generations of exegetes, who share the 
experience of striving to capture in words their understanding of the Qur’an.137 For Bint 
al-Shā†i√ the hermeneutic enquiry is fundamentally linguistic and must therefore be 
anchored in the text. The Qur’an’s basic linguistic constituents, i.e. words and styles, 
are the starting point for revealing its textual unity and distinctness which, though 
firmly rooted in the Arabic language, gave rise to linguistic conventions unique to the 
Qur’an.138 The determination of the linguistic meaning is guided by the application of a 
cross-referential method (istiqrā√) that analyses the internal linguistic convention of the 
Qur’an as a whole.139  
 
This signals an important shift from the way in which Amın al-Khūlı had envisioned the 






what surrounds the text and its formation (m  ˛awl al-naṣṣ), relegating the study of the 
text (al-naṣṣ) to a secondary stage, for which the first is a prerequisite. Bint al-Shā†i√ 
inverts this order, and gives precedence to the linguistic study or enquiry of the text. 
Even here, she departs from al-Khūlı’s historical-philological concerns in favour of a 
systematic reading of the immediate and general textual context of a particular Qur’anic 
word or expression.
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 This inversion has considerable theoretical implications. Al-
Khūlı’s emphasis on the historicality of the text is displaced in Bint al-Shā†i√ by a focus 
on its linguisticality. The relevance of any historical information such as the Qur’an’s 
chronology, the occasions of revelation (asb b al-nuzūl), or the earliest semantic 
connotation of an investigated word (e.g. na ım from na ima, to become green) is 
subsidiary. Bint al-Shā†i√ considers such information useful in supporting a general 
meaning that is not solely justifiable by the results of the linguistic method (e.g., 
kabad).  
 
The relegation of the historical is most clearly expressed by Bint al-Shā†i√ in relation to 
the occasions of revelation, which are traditionally perceived as pertinent to Qur’anic 
exegesis. She accepts that such ‘occasions’ could shed light on the historical context of 
a verse, but rejects their causative function ( illiyya), insisting that they are to be strictly 
treated as accompanying circumstances of a verse’s descent and not the reason for its 
revelation. Against the risk of closing down the Qur’an’s meaning, Bint al-Shā†i√ rejects 
the specificity of the occasion (sabab) or any historical allusion (the Meccan 
persecution of the Prophet in relation to Q. 90:4, for example) in favour of the general 
meaning of the Qur’an’s wording: ‘what must be taken into consideration is the general 
meaning of the wording and not the particular circumstance of its revelation’ (al- ibra 







Al-Khūlı’s historicist interest in pinning down what the Qur’an meant to its first hearers 
before its contemporary relevance might be explored is eclipsed by Bint al-Shā†i√’s 
direct interest in what it might intimate linguistically to the contemporary reader. 
Instead of endeavouring to reclaim the ‘original’ meaning heard in the seventh century, 
she commits herself to discovering ‘the secrets’ of the new meanings that are yet to be 
heard, and which provide guidance on key contemporary questions concerning 
nationalism, language and literature.
142
 The upshot is that the horizon of the 
contemporary reading is not closed down by the historical meaning understood by the 
first Arab hearers, or any later generation. Paradoxically, as a result she appears far 
more historically conscious of the situatedness of her own reading than did al-Khūlı, for 
whom the historicist investigation was the means for liberating the exegete from 
temporality, and deriving a true and authenticated meaning. Al-Khūlı’s confidence in 
method is mitigated in Bint al-Shati by a faith in the irreducibility of the Qur’an’s truth 
to its historical or even textual interpretation, and her resignation to the finitude of her 
own hermeneutic endeavour and acceptance of the limited capacity of any individual 
exegete to grasp the totality of the Qur’an: 
I am not ignorant of the fact that the extent I have reached in my endeavour is 
constrained by my capacity and effort. The field remains open for efforts other 
than mine, of the best of researchers and the succeeding generations who will 
contemplate our greatest Book, grasping what we have missed and aspiring to 
horizons our endeavours could not reach.
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There is a genuine sense here of the finitude and temporality of any reading, past, 
present and future. There is also the possibility of transcending the finitude of 
understanding. This requires the continuous efforts of the future exegetical community 
and presupposes critical engagement with its past. Bint al-Shā†i√ thus conceives of 






by method. The dialogue with the tradition (on kabad and insān, for example) is what 
curtails repetition and permits expansion and transformation. The view conveyed 
through this dialogue is that past understandings can be transcended only when they 
constitute part of the new hermeneutic endeavour.  
 
Since no reading can be definitive, Bint al-Shā†i√ sees interpretive multiplicity as 
inevitable if not necessary. There can never be a hermeneutic closure in her view. Her 
openness to multiplicity, nonetheless, neither binds the text to the polyvalent tradition 
nor exposes it to a relativist pluralism that denies the possibility of truth. On the bridge 
between the finite and the absolute, Bint al-Shā†i√ continues to have expectations of 
truth. In her interpretations of the two verses discussed above, there is a clearly 
identifiable commitment to arriving at a meaning that might justifiably be considered 
closer to truth even if truth, can never be fully grasped by the exegete. This is yet 
another departure from al-Khūlı’s confidence in method as achieving and authenticating 
truth. It could be further argued that Bint al-Shā†i√ offsets al-Khūlı’s reification of 
methodological objectivity by developing a subjective component through her notion of 
‘taste’ (dhawq), that allows the aesthetic to guide the empirical.144 Aesthetic induction 
in Bint al-Shā†i√ merits a separate study; suffice it to say here that it reorients al-Khūlı’s 
emphasis on the detached study of the emotional and psychological impact of the 
aesthetic towards an engaged subjective involvement with the text that draws upon a 
cultivated consciousness of the essence of the Arabic language. It is this consciousness, 
according to Bint al-Shā†i√, that guards against the dangers of linguistic 
misunderstanding, closure of the text, and ideological or cultural perspectivism, thereby 
enabling the exegete to hear unhindered the Qur’an’s intimations and eloquence  






Hermeneutics and humanity  
Underlying Bint al-Shā†i√’s interest in the Qur’an’s eloquence (bayān) is an openly 
acknowledged ontological question. Her choice of the short Meccan suras anticipates 
her disclosure of ‘the key fundamental principles (al-uṣül al-kubr ) of the Islamic 
call’.146 The term uṣül expresses a reformist aspiration to reach the Qur’an’s core 
message - its greater goals (maq ṣid), to use al-Khūlı’s expression - which might 
transform the way in which the Qur’an is applied to more specific issues; this might 
explain why Bint al-Shā†i√ eschews questions related to the immediately practicable in 
her tafsır.147   
 
If Bint al-Shā†i√’s reading is conditioned by the reformist search for the fundamental 
principles or the maq ṣid of the Qur’an, then her persistent exploration of human 
responsibility and human will in the context of several suras in al-Tafsır al-bayānı I-II 
point towards a question concerning ‘humanity’. Before long, her interest in this 
culminated in a separate thematic treatise on humankind (Maq l fi’l-insān, dir sa 
Qur niyya, 1969). Her interpretation of insān and kabad, where she sums up her 
understanding of the Qur’anic view of humankind, has been discussed above.148 
According to Bint al-Shā†i√’s reading, humanity is a mode of existence higher than mere 
physicality (bashariyya) and non-savagery (insiyya); key to realisation of this humanity 
is an ethical responsibility, enabled by freewill, to act as God’s vicegerent, in asserting 
good over evil in this world. Several of Bint al-Shā†i√’s contemporaries advanced 
overlapping readings of humanity.
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 Hers is distinct in that it proceeds to develop a 
theology which grounds hermeneutics in a religious ontology on the basis of a single 
but crucial association of the words bayān and insān in Q 55:3-4: ‘He created the 







In Maq l fi’l-insān, Bint al-Shā†i√ investigates the other two Qur’anic instances of al-
bayān (Q. 75:19 and Q. 3:138), as well as derivatives of the root B-Y-N, such as the 
word bayyin t, designating the Qur’an’s verses as demonstrative proofs. She concludes 
that in Qur’anic usage words formed from B-Y-N always denote ‘clarity’ and ‘revealing 
elucidation’, a meaning different from that of nu†q, which signifies both animal and 
human sound utterances. Adducing evidence from Arabic idiom, she maintains that 
speech utterance (nu†q) can even be figuratively assigned to the non-living, yet the 
predication of bayān in Arabic is to human referents only, hence its technical usage as 




In Bint al-Shā†i√’s view, humankind can be defined as more than a speaking animal 
species; core to humanity is the ability to perceive, discern and clarify meaning through 
language. The act of interpretation is hence central to being human. In this way 
language, understanding, and interpretation become theologically grounded in the 
Qur’an’s concept of humanity. Explaining that eloquent articulations of meaning have 
come to be designated in Arabic as bayān, one of the attributes the Qur’an assigns to 
itself, Bint al-Shā†i√ posits this twofold meaning as the point of connection between 
humanity and the Qur’an.  The Qur’an is bayān, in that it embodies a linguistically 
perfect and beautiful articulation of guidance, which invites understanding and 
interpretation. Human interpretation of the Qur’an is also bayān, in that it achieves and 
communicates an understanding of that guidance and, in so doing, fulfils the Qur’an’s 
expectation of humanity. The two forms of bayān (both text and interpretation) become 
fundamentally linked to each other and to the fulfilment of humanity’s vicegerency. 






influenced by eloquence, and the ability to aesthetically appreciate and comprehend 
how such eloquence affects and compels the human to interpret its meaning, thereby 




Al-bayān, so conceived, can be said to stand for hermeneutics in its philosophical sense 
of the human endeavour to grasp and articulate meaning as encountered in 
texts/language. In specifically qualifying her literary approach as tafsır bayāni - and not 
tafsır adabı - Bint al-Shā†i√ can thus be seen to be doing more than reviving the classical 
Arabic term for the art of eloquent speech. She is encoding the rubric of her exegesis 
with a new understanding of the Qur’an’s religious ontology, where a hermeneutics that 
incorporates the aesthetic is what the divine text expects of the human to realise his/her 
humanity.    
 
4  Gender and hermeneutic application in Bint al-Shā†i√’s approach 
Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır is inaugurated by an expressed awareness of her context as a 
twentieth century exegete espousing a new approach to Qur’an interpretation, an 
approach that aims to renew Muslim religious thought and reinvigorate Arab culture 
and language in a post-colonial nationalist context. However, she does not refer to her 
unique position as the first female author-exegete in a male-dominated literary genre. It 
has repeatedly been noted that this silence is revealing of the fact that her gender had no 
bearing on her exegesis and that, in her main tafsır works (al-Tafsır al-bayānı and al-
I jāz al-bayānı), she does not apply her linguistic analysis of the Qur’an in relation to 
women. This stands in stark contrast to Bint al-Shā†i√’s marked interest in the woman 
question in her fictional, biographical and socially-oriented literature. It runs contrary to 






description, ‘belonged to a vanguard generation of women who made a journey from 
inside the walls of the harem to the farthest horizons of public life...[and] entered into 
three different but interconnected battles: to discard the veil, to be educated and to go 
out to work...the most crucial changes that oriental womanhood has ever seen.’152 This 
apparent exegetical silence has been interpreted as caution, disinterest or 
conservatism,
153





A more favourable assessment of Bint al-Shā†i√ as a female exegete has focused on her 
semi-exegetical work al-Mafhūm al-isl mı li-ta˛rır al-mar√a, where she establishes a 
link between reaching the degree of humanity and transcending gender differentiation 
without eliminating sexual difference.
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 This essay has been noted for its attempt to 
exegetically ground gender equality in the original Qur’anic principle of the equal moral 
responsibility of all men and women in light of the unity of their human origin from a 
single soul (Q4:1).
156
 In spite of this modern reading of the Qur’an’s message on 
gender, Bint al-Shā†i√’s resistance to the hegemony of a western construction of 
feminism and her attempt to accommodate a modified right to qiw ma (male 
protection/guardianship on the basis of the Qur’anic statement ‘men are in charge of 
women’, Q. 4:34) as morally acquired instead of naturally possessed in the end make 
her insufficiently qualified for the label ‘feminist’.157 In less sympathetic western 
feminist discourses, her female voice as exegete has been discredited as having 
uncritically reproduced patriarchy, and failed to challenge traditional assumptions of 
femininity or womanhood,
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 though some indebtedness to her critique of the 
ideological frameworks traditionally imposed upon the Qur’an is nevertheless 
admitted.
159






dimension in Bint al-Shā†i√’s exegesis has been constrained by a narrow notion of 
application; a broader view can better illuminate the link between her hermeneutic 
oeuvre and her position as the first woman exegete in the tafsır genre. 
 
The question of application remained external to modern philosophical hermeneutics 
until Gadamer pointed out its integrality to the hermeneutic process. It is to be 
understood not in terms of the technical, but in light of the situatedness of any 
hermeneutic act; that is to say, interpretation is not only a process of understanding, but 
also involves application, since a text is interpreted in relation to the interpreter’s 
present situation.
160
 In other words, it is ‘neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional 
part of the phenomenon of understanding, but co-determines it as a whole from the 
beginning.’161As such, the task of considering gender in Bint al-Shā†i√’s tafsır is 
concerned less with the applicability of her interpretations to concrete gender questions, 
and more with application as this pervasive aspect of the hermeneutic process, in other 
words, how the understanding she achieves is generated by and related to her situation 
as a woman exegete.  
 
In her largely unknown essay al-Mar√a al-muslima ams wa’l-yawm, which predates al-
Mafhūm al-isl ,162 Bint al-Shā†i√ emphatically states that the need is more urgent than 
ever for a new and liberated treatment of the ‘woman question’ in the Islamic tradition, 
in order to ‘know the reality of our [women’s] position in today’s world and define our 
role in it...’163 Like all Arab and Islamic questions that require understanding, the 
question of woman is of special importance because ‘she is the origin of being, the 







Bint al-Shā†i√ draws a revealing analogy between Qur’anic hermeneutics and the 
question of woman in this context. In the Islamic tradition a cooking metaphor is used 
to refer to three types of religious sciences: a science cooked and burnt, a science 
cooked but not burnt, and a science neither cooked nor burnt. Qur’anic exegesis is 
traditionally considered of the third type, and so, Bint al-Shā†i√ suggests, should the 
woman question.
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 This is what justifies new thinking and authorises her contribution 
in both fields. The cooking analogy evokes a reality where exegesis (tafsır) and women 
never held centre stage in the Islamic tradition. Read in light of her notion of bayān as 
connecting the Qur’an and humanity, Bint al-Shā†i√ can be seen as working through 
structural marginalities within the literary and the lived Islamic tradition, both of which 
have been dominated by fiqh (Islamic law) and men. Her hermeneutic oeuvre can be 
seen in the final analysis as establishing the centrality of tafsır to understanding the 
Qur’an, and reclaiming the place of women as equal members of humanity in the effort 
of Islamic reform.  
 
In her later essay, al-Mafhüm al-isl  li-ta˛rır al-mar√a, Bint al-Shā†i√ employs her 
concept of a humanity derived from the practice of hermeneutics to affirm more than the 
ontological equality between men and women on the basis of the unity of their origin. 
Her essay begins and ends with ‘He created the human being and taught him al-bayān’ 
(Q. 55:3-4). It grounds the liberation of women in reaching the degree of humanity by 
becoming interpreters. Bint al-Shā†i√ is not simply asserting women’s right to education 
but their original right to understanding, interpreting and explaining divine discourse, 
and contesting the meanings established by male interpreters. As in the historical 











Bint al-Shā†i√ contended all her life with a restrictive gender dichotomy, and this 
struggle underpinned her thought and writings. Her broader goal, more explicitly 
expressed in al-Mafhüm al-isl ı, was not to transform the detail of the Islamic 
tradition in relation to gender, but to re-inscribe women’s role in knowledge production 
in a new ontology of humanity that could reform deeper structural inequalities within 
the Islamic tradition. She sought to achieve this by her own practice as a mufassira and 
by her religious ontology of al-bayān as women’s original responsibility/right to 
engage, independently of men, with the divine discourse. In Bint al-Shā†i√, the 
hermeneutic circle can be seen as complete: the first woman to write down a tafsır work 
produces a tafsır that results in a religious ontology which validates woman as a 
mufassira.  
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